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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal and cross-appeal from a Judgment entered against the Utah 
Department of Transportation ("UDOT") in a personal injury case. The Court has 
jurisdiction over that appeal and cross-appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-(3)(j) (Supp. 
1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON UDOT'S CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Has UDOT properly marshaled all the evidence that supports the jury 
verdict? 
2. Is the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, 
legally insufficient to support that verdict? 
3. Did UDOT properly object to the sudden peril instruction or otherwise 
perfect its right to challenge the giving of that instruction? 
4. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in giving a sudden peril 
instruction? 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON McCORVEY'S APPEAL 
1. Is the statutory damage cap of $250,000.00 imposed by the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act unconstitutional on its face or as applied? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW ON UDOTS CROSS-APPEAL 
The jury's verdict finding UDOT 28 percent at fault must be upheld on appeal if 
there is any substantial, competent evidence upon which the jury acting fairly and 
reasonably could have found against UDOT. Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 114 (Utah 
1991). UDOT is required to marshal all the evidence supporting the verdict and then 
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demonstrate that viewed in a light most favorable to that verdict, the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the verdict. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 
(Utah 1991). Furthermore, when as in this case the credibility of witnesses was a 
constant issue at trial, the reviewing court should not disturb a jury's decision based upon 
the jury having viewed the witnesses, weighed the conflicting testimony and found against 
one of the parties after having been properly instructed as to the law. Groen v. Tri-O-
Inc, 667 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah 1980). 
UDOT's challenge to the trial court's decision to instruct on "sudden peril" may 
not be reviewed on appeal unless, at trial, UDOT properly objected to the instruction. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 51. If the objection urged on appeal was not presented to the trial court, 
it should not be considered. Snyderville Transp. Co. v. Christiansen, 609 P.2d 939, 942 
(Utah 1980). The trial court's refusal to grant a new trial based upon the giving of the 
sudden peril instruction will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court abused its 
discretion. Crookston, 817 P.2d at 799. The trial court had no discretion to grant a new 
trial absent a showing by UDOT that the giving of this instruction was an "error in law." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(7). See also Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 89 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON McCORVEY'S APPEAL 
The issue raised in McCorvey's appeal is a question of law. Therefore, the Court 
should accord no deference to the trial court but should review the trial court's ruling for 
correctness. Oates v. Chavez, 749 P.2d 658, 659 (Utah 1988). 
- 2 -
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
McCorvey's appeal challenges the validity of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34. The 
following provisions of the Utah Constitution will be determinative of his appeal: Article 
I, Section 7; Article I, Section 10; Article I, Section 11, and Article I, Section 24. The 
statute and constitutional provisions are set out in the Addendum at Section 1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case. 
This is a personal injury case involving a single car roll-over accident on 1-15 near 
Cove Fort, Utah. Daniel B. McCorvey, a thirty-five year old quadriplegic, sued UDOT 
and its contractor, LeGrand Johnson Construction Company (MLeGrand Johnson") for the 
injuries he sustained in that accident. 
B. Course Of Proceedings, 
McCorvey agrees generally with the "Statement of the Case" contained in UDOT's 
Opening Brief, with the following corrections or clarifications: First, McCorvey's 
Complaint against UDOT was much broader than UDOT's mere approval of a defective 
traffic control plan, which is the only allegation of negligence UDOT addresses in its 
cross-appeal. McCorvey's Complaint alleged that UDOT had created a defective, unsafe 
and dangerous condition on 1-15 and was otherwise negligent for failing: to properly 
warn of the resurfacing operation; to properly set speed limits on 1-15 during such 
resurfacing; to properly warn of the need for reduced speeds; to properly pave and 
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compact the surface; to properly maintain 1-15; and to properly design 1-15 at or near the 
place of the accident. (R. C88-1818, at 0006).l 
Second, following weeks of trial and the testimony of almost forty witnesses, the 
jury returned a Special Verdict in which it found that UDOT was negligent, that UDOTs 
negligence was a proximate cause of McCorvey's injuries, and that UDOTs relative 
proportion of fault was 28 percent. (R. 2521, p. 23). The jury found Daniel 
McCorvey's damages to be $5,421,282.00,. (R. 2523; Special Verdict, Add. § 2). 
UDOT's proportionate share of this verdict was $1,517,800, but the trial court entered 
judgment against UDOT for $250,000. (R. 2659-64; Judgment, Add. § 3). In doing so, 
the trial court rejected McCorvey's argument that the statutory cap on damages was 
unconstitutional. (R. 2602-08; R. 2665-69; R. 3014; Summary Decision, Add. § 4). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Overview. 
Daniel McCorvey was paralyzed when his car rolled over in the median on 1-15 
near Cove Fort, Utah, on August 7, 1986. The accident occurred on a construction 
project where 1-15 was being resurfaced or chip sealed. Chip sealing involves the 
application of oil and gravel to resurface asphalt highways. UDOT was in charge of that 
project. The work was being done by UDOT's contractor, LeGrand Johnson. Pursuant 
lMR" refers to the record on appeal. All subsequent references to the record are to the 
record in the consolidated case, C-87-4304. McCorvey has also filed an Addendum to this brief 
containing certain exhibits and other key documents. Materials contained in the Addendum will 
be cited by exhibit number or description, the abbreviation "Add." and the section of the 
Addendum where that document or exhibit can be found. 
- 4 -
to UDOT regulations LeGrand Johnson obtained $6,000,000 in liability insurance to 
protect motorists. 
The project required LeGrand Johnson to resurface 34 miles of freeway on 1-15 
and 1-70. Daniel McCorvey, an aircraft mechanic with plans to enlist in the Army, was 
traveling with his friend Paul Page to California for a vacation. At mile post 134.2 on 
1-15, McCorvey lost control of his small Honda when the left tire struck a mound or 
clump of thick gravel in the roadway. Through a phenomenon known as "induced steer," 
the gravel slowed McCorvey's left front tire thereby causing the car to steer left and 
leave the road. In the median, McCorvey panicked and attempted to steer back on to the 
roadway, but his tires caught in the soft soil and the vehicle overturned. McCorvey was 
thrown from the Honda and received injuries which left him a quadriplegic. Paul Page 
was also paralyzed as a result of his injuries. 
McCorvey was traveling in the inside or left lane of 1-15 at the time he left the 
roadway. This lane had been chip sealed several days before the accident and was 
supposedly broomed or swept free of gravel. The posted speed limit was 55 miles per 
hour. The lane adjacent to McCorvey (the outside lane) had been chip sealed the day of 
the accident, but the gravel had not been swept from the roadway. The unswept, outside 
lane was supposed to have been closed to motorists, but it was not. Instead, the lane next 
to McCorvey was occupied by P. Wayne Wright and his family in a twelve-passenger 
GMC Suburban. 
When Wright came abreast of McCorvey, the gravel thrown by the Suburban 
machine-gunned McCorvey's little Honda. McCorvey's windshield was broken, and he 
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was showered with rock, dirt and debris. While being pummelled by gravel and debris 
from Wright's Suburban, McCorvey struck a clump or mound of gravel in the roadway, 
which caused the Honda to leave the highway and eventually overturn in the median. 
McCorvey's accident occurred at approximately 4:20 p.m. on a bright, clear 
August afternoon. At the time of the accident, LeGrand Johnson was resurfacing a rest 
area approximately three miles north of the accident scene. This rest area, near mile post 
137, was on the north side of a hill which 1-15 crossed as it moved southward through 
central Utah. The other motorists on the road with McCorvey testified that they saw no 
flaggers or traffic control south of this area. The witnesses all blamed the accident on 
the lack of traffic control, the thick gravel and the failure to close the unbroomed lane 
to motorists. The jury apportioned 50 percent of the fault for McCorvey's injuries to 
LeGrand Johnson, 28 percent to UDOT, 12 percent to Wright and 10 percent to 
McCorvey. 
B. Evidence About UDOT Assuming Liability For The Accident, 
UDOT contends that the evidence does not support the verdict in this case because, 
among other things, LeGrand Johnson's negligence was a superseding cause of the 
accident. (See UDOT Opening Brief at 43). This is indeed an interesting position for 
UDOT to take on appeal because UDOT made a conscious decision at trial to take full 
responsibility for both motorists' safety on this project and the McCorvey accident. More 
importantly though, in doing so UDOT not only failed to present any evidence against 
the contractor, LeGrand Johnson, but UDOT also argued at trial that the contractor had 
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done nothing wrong.2 The following are examples of what was clearly a tactical decision 
by UDOT to shoulder responsibility for the accident.3 This evidence was not marshaled 
by UDOT in its Opening Brief. 
(1) Richard Griffin: Richard Griffin, the UDOT Project Engineer assigned 
to the Cove Fort chip-seal project, testified that he was to see that the contractor complied 
with the specifications and to inspect the project. (R. 3004, p. 141). Griffin visited the 
2The UDOT inspector for this project testified that the contractor had done "an excellent 
job of signing." (R. 3005, p. 158). Similarly, the UDOT engineer in charge of the project 
testified that the contractor did a good job in accordance with the specifications. (R. 2998, p. 
32). Other UDOT officials testified that the contractor had followed UDOT's specifications for 
the project. (R. 3004, p. 90). This testimony was clearly intended to exculpate the contractor, 
and it was largely brought out on cross-examination by UDOT. Furthermore, throughout the 
trial UDOT repeatedly told the jury that the contractor had done nothing wrong. (See, e.g.. R. 
3009, p. 76). UDOT went so far in closing argument as to say that McCorvey was making the 
contractor the "scapegoat" for his injuries. (R. 3008, p. 66). 
3In addition to the testimony at trial, the following factors suggest that UDOT made a 
tactical decision to take full responsibility for the accident at trial: UDOT refused to make any 
offer of settlement. UDOT retained and paid for all of the defense expert witnesses. (R. 2988, 
p. 5; R. 2990, p. 6; R. 2992, p. 5). UDOT then turned these witnesses over to LeGrand 
Johnson's counsel and, at State expense, several times flew LeGrand Johnson's counsel, the out-
of-state expert witnesses from Maine and Texas as well as other fact and in-state expert 
witnesses to the accident scene so that they could prepare a joint defense. (R. 2988, p. 5; R. 
3000, pp. 203-205; R. 3005, p. 114). UDOT made no cross-claim against LeGrand Johnson 
and offered no evidence against LeGrand Johnson despite clear negligence on the part of the 
contractor and LeGrand Johnson's agreement to indemnify the State. (See R. 2999, pp. 61-62 
(acknowledging an indemnity agreement between the contractor and UDOT); see also R. 2642, 
UDOT Reg. 107.14, Add. § 5 (UDOT's regulation requiring indemnification and insurance); 
R. 2998, p. 114 Plf s Ex. 8, Add. 6; R. 3004, 157-58 (UDOT's regulations were part of the 
contract with Johnson)). Under these circumstances, it was both suspicious and strange for 
UDOT to take responsibility for the accident and thereby protect the contractor, who was fully 
insured. But having done so, it is extremely disingenuous for UDOT to now claim that the jury 
should have assigned more fault to LeGrand Johnson and that UDOT should not be responsible 
for its share of the verdict. Before the trial court UDOT's position was LeGrand Johnson had 
done nothing wrong. UDOT should be estopped from contending otherwise on its cross-appeal. 
Cf. Bailey v. Mead, 492 P.2d 798, 801 (Ore. 1971) (when a party testifies deliberately to a fact, 
it cannot have the benefit of evidence tending to falsify it). 
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work site on Sunday, August 3, 1986, several days before the accident. (IcL at p. 173). 
As a result of that visit, Griffin wrote a memo to Curtis Berry, the UDOT inspector on 
the project, pointing out some serious operational problems with the manner in which 
LeGrand Johnson was doing the work. In that memo, Griffin observed that the 
contractor "is using far too many chips." (Plf s Ex. 11, Add. § 7).4 Griffin was also 
critical of the contractor's sign placement. Griffin wrote that "signs on the north end of 
the project are misplaced. These signs should be immediately in advance of the chip 
placement." (IcL). Griffin observed in his memorandum that because of the improper 
sign placement, "the traffic did not slow down until it came upon the chips." (Id.). 
Finally, Griffin stated in his memo that he wanted the contractor to chip seal one lane at 
a time and to keep the traffic off the chipped lane until it was completed. (Id.). 
Griffin's statement in the memo about chip sealing one lane at a time and then 
closing that lane to traffic until it had been broomed free of gravel was corroborated by 
the testimony of LeGrand Johnson's project superintendent, Steven Peterson. Peterson 
testified that Griffin had told him to chip seal one lane at a time. (R. 2998, p. 27). 
4Griffin thought the contractor was using 38.5 pounds of gravel per square yard instead 
of the 23 pounds per square yard required in the contract. At trial, Griffin stated that he was 
mistaken about the 38.5 pounds of gravel per square yard. (R. 3004, p. 194). Instead of 38.5 
pounds, Griffin testified that the contractor was using 25 pounds per square yard. (Ji at 196). 
Griffin made the unbelievable statement that while 38.5 pounds per square yard was a waste of 
chips, in his opinion it did not pose a hazard to motorists. (Id. at 202-03). This recanting of 
prior testimony by UDOT employees was rampant throughout the trial. This change of 
testimony typically occurred after direct examination by McCorvey and a break during which 
the witness would meet with defense counsel. When the witness resumed the stand, he would 
unabashedly try to explain the change in testimony with some transparent excuse such as having 
been "confused.M (See, e ^ R. 3005, pp. 186-188). The credibility of these UDOT witnesses 
was undoubtedly damaged beyond repair by this defense tactic. 
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Peterson also testified that Griffin told him to keep the lane being chip sealed closed until 
it was broomed free of rocks, d i . at 42 and 94). Peterson insisted that the inside lane 
of 1-15 had been broomed free of rock several days before the accident, and motorists 
could drive in this lane at speeds of 55 miles per hour. Q$L at 37-38). Peterson admitted 
that there was gravel in the outside lane, but he claimed that this lane was closed to 
traffic because it had not been broomed. (Id,, at p. 40). 
Peterson's diary revealed that on August 4, 1986, he had a meeting with Griffin 
and Curtis Berry at which they discussed chip sealing one lane at a time. (Plf s Ex. 34; 
Add. § 8). At this meeting Griffin told Peterson to do one lane at a time, chip it, roll 
it and keep people off of it until evening, then sweep it and "break it loose," which meant 
to "turn the traffic loose" on the completed lane. (R. 2998, p. 94). Griffin's memo and 
the statements by Peterson that he was to have closed the outside lane at the accident 
scene until it had been broomed free of rock were powerful pieces of evidence against 
the contractor. But this evidence was not to go uncontradicted. Surprisingly though, the 
contradictions came from UDOT and not from LeGrand Johnson. 
Griffin testified that UDOT was responsible for motorist safety on the project. (R. 
3004, p. 43). Griffin then proceeded to make incredible statements about how UDOT 
wanted to protect motorists. He testified that UDOT wanted excess chips on the road 
because "the more chips put on the road the more careful the traffic is going to be." (R. 
3004, p. 202). Griffin further testified that notwithstanding his memo and notwithstand-
ing Peterson's testimony, the outside lane was not to have been closed to motorists' use. 
(Id. p. 201). Griffin also testified that he was allowing traffic to drive on the unswept 
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lane at 55 miles per hour! (LI p. 198). Thereafter followed a parade of UDOT 
witnesses, including UDOT's expert witnesses, who not only made Griffin look foolish 
and untruthful for his opinions, but made the excessive gravel, unclosed lanes and lack 
of speed control the principal causes of the accident. 
The first such witness was Curtis Berry, the UDOT project safety inspector, who 
testified that the contractor was to keep the lane being chip sealed closed until it was 
broomed and only then was the lane to be open to traffic. (R. 3005, pp. 108-109). 
Berry also testified that in his opinion, high speeds on chip sealed roads could be unsafe. 
QcL at 131). Hence, Berry wanted to keep traffic slowed down on the chip seal project 
so that there would be fewer accidents. QkL at 131). Berry testified that the speed limit 
throughout the chip seal project was supposed to have been 25 miles per hour! (IdL at 
111, 187). 
Berry's testimony was bolstered by UDOT's accident reconstructionist, Newell 
Knight, and its chip seal expert witness, Robert A. Galloway. Knight said that driving 
50 to 60 miles per hour was too fast for this road, that such speeds were "unsafe because 
you are going to throw rocks and gravel all over," and that is why you should use the 25 
mph signs. (R. 3010, pp. 103-04). Galloway likewise testified that the traffic on this 
project should have been controlled to 25 miles per hour through placement of signs and 
that these signs should have been spaced at intervals of 500 to 1,000 feet throughout the 
project. (R. 3010, pp. 52, 54-55). But the UDOT officials in charge of the project, 
UDOT's defense witnesses, UDOT's expert witnesses and UDOT's counsel all admitted 
or testified that there was only one 25 mph sign on this project and that this was an 
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advisory sign, not a regulatory sign. (R. 3005, pp. 182-183; R. 3007, p. 46; R. 3006, 
pp. 234, 249; Plf s Exs. 75 and 76; R. 3009, p. 78). Galloway was very critical of 
UDOT for the lack of traffic control signs. When asked if one 25 mph sign was 
sufficient to slow motorists' speed for four miles on this project, Galloway responded: 
"I wouldn't think so, no." (R. 3010, p. 53). 
(2) Curtis Berry: Curtis Berry was Richard Griffin's "eyes and earsM on the 
scene. (R. 3005, p. 89). On direct examination by McCorvey's counsel, Berry testified 
that he had little control over the contractor. Berry said that while he could make 
suggestions about how the project was managed, the contractor had full control on the 
project, including keeping motorists' speeds at 25 miles per hour. (IcL at 103, 111). But 
under examination by UDOT, after a break in the court proceedings during which he met 
with LeGrand Johnson's counsel, Berry recanted his earlier testimony. Berry stated that 
he drove the project every day checking signs; that he was always inspecting the traffic 
control; and that he had the power to stop the project if the contractor was doing things 
improperly. QcL at 133, 158-61, 188-89). Berry also testified that he had responsibility 
for seeing that the traffic control plan was properly executed. (LI at 94, 95, 133 and 
158-61). Berry even admitted that he was responsible for motorist safety and traffic 
control on this project. (Id at 133).5 
5Although Berry was responsible for traffic control, he in fact never had a copy of the 
UDOT traffic control plan after the first day's operation. (IcL at 100). This undoubtedly 
explains why after McCorvey's accident a young woman was killed on this project when her 
small car went out of control in an unswept lane. This fatal accident occurred on the 1-70 
portion of the chip seal project. A four mile section of 1-70 had been chip sealed on Friday, 
August 8, 1986, the day after McCorvey's accident, and Berry had permitted the contractor to 
leave the roadway with the outside lane unswept over the weekend. David Merchant, a LeGrand 
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The contractor, LeGrand Johnson, had the responsibility to remove the excess 
gravel from the roadway by brooming. (Plf s Ex. 8, § 405.08; Add. § 6; R. 2998, p. 
31). Griffin told Johnson's superintendent Peterson to sweep the lanes in the evening 
before letting traffic back onto the roadway. (R. 2998, pp. 31, 94). Griffin even 
admitted that his supervisor, Steve Noble, told him that the project needed to be swept. 
(R. 3005, p. 48). But despite having told Peterson to sweep, both Griffin and Berry 
failed to see that the roadway was swept clean of gravel before the repaired lane was 
opened to traffic. 
While it was initially not UDOTs job to broom this project, UDOT assumed the 
responsibility to sweep the roadway. Several UDOT employees were on the project 
nearly every day running a broom. (R. 3007, p. 29; R. 2998, p. 35). One of these 
UDOT employees, Alt Staples, had been the UDOT shed foreman at Cove Fort for 32 
years. (R. 3007, p. 16). As shed foreman, Staples had responsibility for 1-15. Q± at 
32). Staples was out there brooming the Cove Fort project because LeGrand Johnson 
was falling behind and because he felt an obligation to the traveling public. (Id at 31). 
Staples also said he was brooming because he wanted the road safe and wanted to protect 
Johnson employee, testified that a young woman was killed on this stretch of road the following 
Monday, August 11, 1986, when her "Honda Civic" went out of control as she came "off the 
old road onto the chips." (R. 3006, p. 76). The jury sat in stunned disbelief when Curtis Berry 
testified that he was on this four mile stretch of 1-70 the date of this fatal accident supposedly 
performing his sign placement and safety duties, but did not learn of the fatality until 1990, just 
months before the McCorvey trial! (R. 3005, p. 134). 
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the people. (IdL at 30).6 Staples was running the broom as much as eight hours a day 
on the project because LeGrand Johnson was falling behind in brooming the roadway. 
(H. at 29, 31). 
C. Evidence About Excessive Gravel At The Accident Scene. 
UDOT safety inspector, Curtis Berry, testified that there was no excess gravel on 
the roadway at the accident scene. (R. 3005, pp. 110, 170-71). But Berry was lying, 
and the jury knew it. The evidence at trial clearly established that excessive gravel on 
the shoulders and outside lane of 1-15 at the accident scene, along with the Wright's 
Suburban in the lane adjacent to McCorvey's, was a major cause of this accident. This 
evidence, however, is mysteriously absent from UDOTs Opening Brief. 
McCorvey's accident reconstruction expert, a research engineer named Ernest 
Klein, concluded that McCorvey's accident was the result of a phenomenon known as 
"induced steer." (R. 3002, p. 30). Klein's opinion was that McCorvey lost control of 
his vehicle when his left wheels struck thick gravel in the roadway. This gravel caused 
the left wheels to slow down, which in turn steered the car left into the median. (IcL at 
6Alt Staples was a witness that UDOT called, and his testimony was particularly harmful 
to UDOT because he too severely impeached the testimony of Griffin. Staples, for example, 
testified that Griffin had told him to sweep the project; whereas Griffin testified that he wanted 
traffic to travel on the unswept lane. (R. 3007, p. 30; R. 3004, p. 197). Staples could not 
believe that Griffin had said that he wanted the public to travel at 55 mph on the unswept lane. 
Staples said that it was not safe to travel at those speeds on an unbroomed lane. Moreover, 
when Staples was told that Griffin had said that he wanted the public to travel at 55 mph on the 
unswept lanes, Staples looked at the jury and asked incredulously, "Did he say it was 55?" 
Staples said that if Griffin had said that, then Griffin must have been mistaken. Qd^ at 35-36). 
Staples also said that traffic should not drive faster than 35 mph on an unbroomed lane and that 
he would expect to see more than one 25 mph speed sign on a project such as the Cove Fort 
chip seal. (Id, 33-34). 
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30-31). Klein said that the excess gravel left on the roadway started the events that 
eventually caused McCorvey to leave the road. Q$L at 37). Klein testified that "an inch 
or more is sufficient" to cause the phenomenon of induced steer in McCorvey's small 
Honda Civic. (Id, at 41-42). 
Klein's testimony was consistent with the testimony of eye witnesses to the 
accident. Edward Villarreal, a professional truck driver, was driving a semi-truck in the 
outside lanes of 1-15 southbound towards the accident scene when he was passed by 
McCorvey. (R. 3004, pp. 4, 7). Villarreal testified that there were no flaggers or 
anything else to slow down the traffic. (IdL at 6). While he did remember seeing a sign 
for reduced speed (he thought it was 35 mph), there was only one such sign, and it was 
miles north of the accident scene. (Id,, at 5-6). Villarreal described how the Wrights in 
their heavy GMC Suburban van passed him and caught up with McCorvey's Honda 
Civic. (IdL at 11). The Wrights were attempting to pass McCorvey in the outside lane 
when Villarreal saw the little Honda "kind of wiggle." (Id, at 11). McCorvey's left 
front wheel then hit the gravel and the car flipped. (R. 3004, p. 11). 
McCorvey's description of the events leading up to the accident was consistent 
with Villarreal's and Klein's opinions about the immediate cause of the accident. 
McCorvey entered a construction area miles north of the accident scene. (R. 3003, pp. 
13, 63-64). McCorvey emerged from this area and drove towards the accident scene at 
55 miles per hour on what he thought was a good highway. Qd at 15, 65-66, 70). He 
drove on the inside lane of 1-15 for three or four miles, when suddenly, without warning 
he came upon thick gravel. (IdL at 19). When he encountered the gravel, McCorvey 
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down shifted and slowed to approximately 40 miles per hour. (I&. at 73). McCorvey 
remembers the gravel in the inside lane being in intermittent "mounds" or "clumps," with 
the outside lane being worse. (ML at 23, 72-73). 
McCorvey lost control when the Wright's Suburban came abreast of him in the 
outside lane and showered his Honda with an incredible amount of gravel. He described 
it as being sprayed by a machine gun. QdL at 20-21).7 The gravel shattered the Honda's 
windshield. McCorvey tried to accelerate to stay ahead of the Wrights, but could not, 
at which time he slowed down. It was at this point that McCorvey's little Honda struck 
"some big clump of gravel," became completely uncontrollable and left the road. (Id 
at 23, 78-79, 97-99). McCorvey testified that he was turning right, the car wanted to 
turn left, and whatever input he gave the car, it did not seem to respond. (Id at 71-72). 
McCorvey believed that all of this happened in approximately one and a half seconds. 
(Id at 23). 
The jury likewise heard from motorists such as C. Dewey Taylor, who said that 
at the accident scene there was so much gravel that you "could have picked up a 
wheelbarrow full." (R. 3009, p. 109). Taylor was immediately followed by the truck 
driver, Edward Villarreal, who likewise testified that the gravel was deep on the 
shoulder. (R. 3004, p. 11). 
Highway Patrol officer Max Shields, who investigated the McCorvey accident, also 
remembered gravel on the roadway. (R. 3006, p. 195). Officer Shields testified that the 
7Bryan Wright testified that the Suburban in which he was riding "pummelled" 
McCorvey's little car with rock as they came abreast of the little Honda. (R. 3007, p. 153). 
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gravel would have caused McCorvey to spin out if he were accelerating. (IcL at 196).8 
Shields likewise testified that drivers, including McCorvey, would have to take some 
action to avoid being hit by the shower of gravel thrown against them by other cars. In 
Shields' opinion, McCorvey's reasonable options were to go ahead or to slow down to 
get away from the rocks being thrown at him by the Suburban. Shields said that the 
worst thing for McCorvey to do would be to stay next to the Wrights while rocks were 
being thrown. (Id, at 196).9 
Carla Wright was a passenger in the van next to McCorvey at the time of the 
accident. Mrs. Wright remembers seeing McCorvey's Honda "hit the thick gravel and 
leave the road." (R. 3007, p. 88). But Mrs Wright did not realize how thick the gravel 
was until she actually stopped at the accident scene and got out of the van. (R. 3007, p. 
94). She described the gravel at the accident scene as deep, thick and deepest on the 
shoulder. (R. 3007, pp. 88, 91). 
8The paramedics spun out in their ambulance on the gravel as they were leaving the 
accident scene. (R. 3005, p. 81). On a photograph taken at the accident scene, UDOT's 
accident reconstruction expert, Newell Knight, even identified for the jury a "hump of gravel" 
on the roadway near where McCorvey lost control of his car. (R. 3010, p. 100-102; Plf s Ex. 
3kx). Knight was forced to make this identification after he and other UDOT witnesses were 
exposed before the jury as having used photographs taken of the roadway where McCorvey's 
vehicle came to rest to supposedly show an absence of gravel. These photographs, with a swept 
roadway, were relatively gravel free; whereas, the photographs nearer to where McCorvey lost 
control clearly showed an abundance of rock on the roadway. (Plf s Exs. 3k, 31, 3m, 3o, 3dd, 
3kx, 31x, 3ddx and 64). A particularly good photograph showing intermittent ridges of gravel 
almost covering the two-inch reflector tabs, Plf s Ex. 3k, is included in the Addendum at § 9. 
9One of UDOT's traffic engineering expert witnesses, Richard Leuttich, agreed with 
Officer Shields about McCorvey's options. Leuttich testified that McCorvey could either have 
gone ahead or dropped behind to avoid the gravel being thrown by the Wright's Suburban. (R. 
3006, p. 232). Leuttich likewise said that in his opinion the presence of the Wright's Suburban 
in the lane adjacent to McCorvey was a major cause of the accident. (Id* at 237). 
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Charlene Wright was also a passenger in the van next to McCorvey. She too 
described the gravel at the accident scene as deep. (R. 3007, p. 126). When the Wrights 
stopped at the accident scene, Bryan Wright, another passenger, walked back along 1-15 
to the point near where McCorvey left the road. He described the gravel as deep on the 
shoulder. (R. 3007, pp. 150-151). Mr. Wright was shocked at the amount of gravel on 
the roadway, which was two or three inches thick and six or seven inches thick in places 
near the shoulder. (Id, at 145, 153). 
Finally, the driver of the van, P. Wayne Wright, testified about the deep gravel 
on the roadway. (R. 3007, pp. 170-171). But in the heavy Suburban with twelve 
passengers, including children, the Wrights did not appreciate the danger posed by the 
gravel. (IdL at 93-94, 153, 155, 170). P. Wayne Wright said there was no warning 
about the road conditions. (R. 3007, p. 170). All the Wrights said that there were no 
flaggers slowing traffic, and that the only signs they saw — including a single 25 mile per 
hour sign - were miles north of the accident scene. (R. 3007, pp. 73-74, 85, 89, 97, 
121-122, 134, 149-150, 151-152, 168). 
The Wrights testified too about the angry people who stopped to help McCorvey 
and Page. These people were angry because their vehicles had been damaged by the 
rock. (R. 3007, pp. 95, 96, 126, 153). Taylor, Villarreal, the Wrights and every other 
person who traveled that short stretch of road at the accident scene had significant 
damage done to their vehicles. (R. 3004, p. 8; R. 3007, p. 89). Carla Wright was 
trying to help Paul Page who, with a broken back, broken leg, nine missing teeth and an 
arm almost severed from his body, was lying in the median screaming, "God help me." 
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(R. 3007, pp. 91-92). While she was caring for Page, the other motorist who had 
stopped to help "almost came to a fist fight" because of the rock damage they had done 
to each others' vehicles. (LL at p. 96).10 
10These people were not the only ones angry at UDOT for the road conditions. The 
project was driven by the Reverend Charles Bartow in his new Buick Century station wagon. 
(R. 3005, p. 56). Reverend Bartow's new car was trashed by the rock being thrown by passing 
vehicles. Bartow drove for miles through this chip seal project without seeing a sign or any 
traffic control. Bartow did not encounter any reasonable or prudent drivers on that road. Each 
time his car was passed, he was hit by a "barrage of stones." (IcL at 75-76). Reverend Bartow 
was reduced to fits of cursing each time a vehicle passed him and his car was further damaged. 
(See kL at 60, 63, 66). He was so angered by this experience that later in the day he wrote 
directly to UDOT to complain about the hazardous road conditions. He took UDOT to task for 
failing to close the lane, failing to sweep gravel from the road, the lack of speed control and the 
lack of warning signs throughout the project. Bartow said that the roadway was definitely 
hazardous and that he felt that there ought to have been some kind of traffic control and signs 
indicating that people should not pass. (R. 3005, pp. 59-60). In his letter to UDOT, Reverend 
Bartow wrote: 
It seems to me irresponsible of road crews to leave an interstate highway in such shape. 
One lane should be closed for repairs until fully ready for service, then the next lane 
repaired. Traffic should be slowed into the single safe lane. This method, as far as I 
know, is observed in every other state. 
(Plf s Exhibit 30; Add. § 10). (Emphasis added). 
Daniel McCorvey experienced similar anger over the conditions he encountered on 1-15. 
(R. 3003, p. 36). Truck driver Villarreal remembered being angry about the lack of traffic 
control. (R. 3004, p. 9). Another motorist, Mr. Taylor, was so angry about the lack of traffic 
control that he tried to run other motorists off the road so they would not pass him and damage 
his vehicle. (R. 3009, p. 104-105). UDOT retained Arthur Geurts, the State of Utah's former 
chief traffic engineer, as an expert witness, but did not call him at trial because during his 
deposition Geurts said that the presence of gravel on the road causes drivers to become 
aggressive and take excessive risks in order to avoid damaging their vehicles. When he read 
Geurts' deposition testimony, even project engineer Griffin agreed that chip seal projects could 
cause such driver "agitation." (R. 3004, pp. 204-206). 
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D. Evidence About The Lack Of Speed Control On The Project. 
Altogether, 34 miles of freeway were being chip sealed on 1-15 and 1-70. (R. 
3004, p. 192). The traffic control plan actually used by LeGrand Johnson required 
regulatory 25 mph signs to be placed on the project. (Plf s Ex. 10). These speed signs 
were to be furnished by UDOT. (R. 2998, p. 29). But rather than numerous regulatory 
black and white speed control signs throughout the project, UDOT supplied the contractor 
with a single 25 mph orange and black advisory speed sign, which the eye witnesses to 
the accident said was located miles north of the accident scene.11 More importantly, 
instead of a 25 mph sign to reduce motorists' speeds, at the accident scene there was a 
55 mph sign. (Plf s Ex. 3s, Add. § 11; R. 3004, p. 97). This and other crucial evidence 
showing a lack of speed control is likewise absent from UDOT's Opening Brief. 
1-15 was designed for speeds up to 80 miles per hour. (R. 3004, p. 97). But 
UDOT project engineer Griffin did nothing to keep traffic slowed down even on the 
chipped but unbroomed outside lane. (R. 3004, pp. 191-192). Not surprisingly, with the 
gravel littered roadway at the accident scene, both expert and lay witnesses alike testified 
that UDOT's failure to control the speed of traffic through the construction zone was a 
major contributing cause of this accident. Peter Holton, for instance, a UDOT employee 
and an expert on traffic control, acknowledged that traffic control on work zones should 
1:LThe contract stated that UDOT "will furnish to the Contractor advisory speed signs." 
(Plf s Ex. 8, § 405.09; Add. § 6). But UDOT did not do so! LeGrand Johnson's Superin-
tendent even complained to Curtis Berry about "having signs spread out so thin." (R. 2998, p. 
99; Peterson Diary August 8, 1986, Plf s Ex. 34, Add. § 8). Other LeGrand Johnson 
employees gave similar testimony about the signs being "too thinM and not sufficient to keep 
traffic speeds down. (R. 3004, pp. 135-136; R. 3006, p. 78; R. 3007, p. 48). 
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be designed on the assumption that motorists will only reduce their speeds if they clearly 
perceive a need to do so. (R. 2998, p. 183). Holton also agreed that while it was 
important to give motorists enough warning of highway hazards so they are not surprised 
by the condition, one had to be careful not to place signs too distant from the hazard 
because motorists might forget the warning, d i . at 175).12 
With respect to the UDOT traffic control plan used on this chip seal project, 
Holton smiled and said that he had never seen one quite like it. (Id at 198). Holton 
then testified about the principle of "positive guidance," a concept whereby the motorist 
is led through the construction activity. (IdL at 185). Holton said that you must take the 
motorist by the hand and lead him right through the project the way you want him to go 
leaving him no choice. Otherwise the motorist may choose the wrong action and have 
an accident. (Id, at 184-185). 
McCorvey's traffic engineering expert, Edward Ruzak, mirrored Holton's 
opinions. Ruzak testified that the purpose of positive guidance is to protect the motorist 
and to provide stringent traffic control so errors do not happen and accidents are reduced. 
(R. 3000, p. 64). Positive guidance does not "go out the window" in a chip seal 
12This is exactly the situation which Richard Griffin warned of in his August 3, 1986, 
memo when he told Curtis Berry that the signs were too far from the project and that traffic was 
not slowing down until it came up on the chips, (supra. > at p. 8). As if to drive home the point 
about the need to have speed control signs close to the work activity, defendants called a 
paramedic who treated Paul Page at the accident scene to testify that Page said to him, "We 
were going too fast." (R. 3006, p. 107). On cross examination, however, the paramedic 
admitted that he had earlier said that Page had said, "I came upon some cars too fast." (Id,, at 
110). In the condition Page was in at the accident scene, it is hard to assign much credibility 
to anything he supposedly said. But assuming the comments about driving "too fast" for the 
amount of gravel encountered were true, they were certainly consistent with both Holton and 
Griffin's concerns about the dangerous manner in which the project was being signed. 
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operation according to Ruzak. (Id*, at 66). Ruzak said that chip seal operations are 
hazardous because of the rock and that there is a potential for serious accidents, thus the 
need for "guidance and strict control" on such operations. GsL at 66). 
The eye witnesses to the accident also complained about the lack of speed control. 
At the accident scene, Bryan Wright asked the construction workers where the flagmen 
were to control speed.13 The workers immediately left without comment. (R. 3007, pp. 
151-152). Villarreal, the truck driver, also went up to the superintendent of the project 
at the accident scene and complained about the lack of traffic control: "I went up and 
told him, 'Why isn't there somebody out there to tell the people to slow down'." (R. 
3004, p. 13). P. Wayne Wright had a similar experience. When he stopped at the 
accident scene, P. Wayne Wright was approached by the construction foreman who 
wanted Wright to sign a statement that McCorvey was driving too fast. Wright refused 
and asked instead "where the flagmen were." (R. 3007, p. 169). The superintendent told 
Wright that it was none of his business and to "shut up and get out of here, buddy." (Id. 
13Defendants called Allen Syddall, a flagger on the construction project, who testified 
that driving above 50 miles an hour was too fast for this project because motorists would slide 
on the gravel. (R. 3007, pp. 61-62). Syddall claimed to have been perhaps a quarter mile north 
of the accident scene. Q(L at 56). Syddall also claimed to have stepped out halfway into the 
outside lane in an effort to slow down McCorvey as he drove past. (Id. at 64). Syddall claimed 
that McCorvey passed him at between 50 and 55 miles per hour. (I$Lat57). Syddall, however, 
did not remember seeing the Wrights driving in the lane in which he was supposedly standing. 
Neither did he remember seeing Villarreal's semi-truck, which was behind the Wrights, or the 
other semi-truck which was ahead of the Wrights in the same lane. QdL at 64). The jury 
thereafter had some light moments involving the impeachment of Syddall by testimony from the 
Wrights, who had driven the lane in which Syddall claimed he was standing, but did not hear 
a "thud" or leave a "mess" on the roadway. (R. 3007, pp. 100, 122, 168). 
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at 172). Wright documented that conversation in a letter written August 3, 1987. (Plf s 
Ex. 41, Add. § 12). 
These lay witnesses all testified that the accident would not have happened if there 
had been some speed control on the project. Truck driver Villarreal said: "Nobody was 
slowing down the traffic. That accident wouldn't have happened if there had been some 
supervision. I'll just put it just plain that way." (R. 3004, p. 40).14 Villarreal stated 
that if the road had been in the condition it should have been, Wright could have passed 
McCorvey at 100 miles an hour and nothing would have happened. But with all of that 
loose rock, it was Villarreal's opinion that the unswept outside lane "shouldn't have been 
traveled on." (Id at p. 41). 
E. Evidence About Missing Signs. 
UDOT claims that at the time of McCorvey's accident, 1-15 was well marked with 
signs and other traffic control devices warning motorists of the hazardous condition of 
the roadway. UDOT prepared a chart which supposedly illustrated the abundance of such 
signs from mile post 137 south to the accident site at mile post 134.2. (Def s Ex. 115). 
To bolster its claim that the project was adequately signed, UDOT also referred to two 
charts prepared by LeGrand Johnson's Superintendent, Steven Peterson, which supposedly 
document the signing in place at the time of the accident. (Plf s Exs. 35 & 36). But 
14Mr. Taylor gave an almost identical opinion to Villarreal's: 
I just knew that the road was hazardous and people should have been driving slower. 
But there was nobody out there to make them drive slower. And as you know, on roads 
today, you have got to make people drive slow or they're not going to drive slow. 
(R. 3009, p. 112). (Emphasis added). 
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McCorvey clearly proved at trial that these signs were never on the road that day or else 
had been placed after the accident! Yet somehow this evidence does not appear in 
UDOT's Brief. 
Daniel Webster was a UDOT employee whose duty was to investigate serious 
accidents. (R. 3004, p. 48). Webster was notified of the McCorvey accident on August 
7, 1986, at approximately 4:30 p.m. He was in Cedar City, Utah, at the time. He 
arrived at the accident scene at approximately 5:40 p.m. that same day. QdL at 49). 
When he arrived at the accident scene, the ambulance was gone. (IcL at 50). Webster 
spent three or four minutes at the accident scene talking with Curtis Berry before he 
started his investigation. QdL at 63). Webster then drove north of the accident scene, 
well beyond the rest area at mile post 137, from which point he turned around and started 
south towards the accident scene photographing the signs he saw along the roadway. (IcL 
at 62-64). 
Webster's photographs were introduced into evidence as Plaintiffs Exs. 3 a through 
3dd, 3ex, 3fx, 3kx, 31x, 3tx, 3yx, 3ddx, 53 and 59. These photographs show Loose 
Gravel signs, Right Lane Closed signs, Flagmen Ahead signs and several "early 
warners.M (Plf s Exs. 3a, 3b, 3c, 3g, 3h, 3j). With two exceptions, all of these signs 
were placed miles north of the accident scene. The two exceptions were "early warners" 
which Webster photographed closer to the accident scene.15 
15Early warners are the tall, flashing arrow board signs. (See Plf s Exs. 3g, 3h, 3w, 
58). These signs are approximately ten to eleven feet high and eight feet wide. (R. 2998, p. 
113). So large, in fact, that they could hardly be missed by a motorist. (R. 2998, p. 218). 
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The first early warner Webster encountered as he approached the site of the 
accident from the north was sitting in the median approximately one mile from the 
accident scene. There was no "Loose Gravel 25 MPH" sign on this early warner. (Id 
at 68, Plf s Ex. 3g). The only advisory 25 mph sign that Webster saw in his investiga-
tion was on the second early warner, which was located in the middle of the outside lane 
of 1-15 several hundred yards north of the accident site. (R. 3004, pp. 68-69). 
Curtis Berry told Webster that both early warners had been in place at the time 
of the accident to move traffic from the chipped outside lane into the inside lane. (Id. 
at 60-63). Webster was also told that at the time of the accident the first early warner 
was on the roadway but it had been mysteriously pulled off the road after the accident. 
(14. at 78). Webster freely admitted, however, that he had no personal knowledge as to 
whether or not either early warner was on the road at the time of the accident, or whether 
any of the signs he photographed that day had actually been in place at the time of the 
accident. (IcL 78). In fact, the evidence showed that the early warners and other traffic 
control signs were placed after the accident. 
Perhaps the most important exhibit of the trial on the question of signing was Plf s 
Exhibit 17. This exhibit was first used with Daniel Webster, and it was identical to Defs' 
Exhibit 115 with one important difference. Webster was asked to mark on Plf s Exhibit 
17 where the signs which he photographed were located. Thereafter, witness after 
witness took the stand during trial and testified that these signs were either not up at the 
time of the accident or else located miles north of the accident scene. These witnesses 
then each took a different colored marker and crossed off the signs they remembered not 
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having been in place at the accident scene, and marked on Exhibit 17 the location at 
which these signs were actually located at the time of the accident.16 When the exhibit 
was completed, Highway Patrol officers, paramedics, motorists and LeGrand Johnson 
employees had all testified that the only signs they had seen were miles north of the 
accident scene beyond the rest area. More importantly, the motorists who had driven in 
the outside lane of 1-15 that day all testified that not only were there no early warners 
where UDOT claimed, but these early warners could not have been in the middle of the 
outside lane as UDOT contended because they would have driven over them.17 
UDOT's other evidence that the signs were in place at the time of the accident 
came from Steven Peterson. Peterson testified that he prepared two charts which 
supposedly showed the signs in place throughout the project at the moment of 
McCorvey's accident. (Plf s Exs. 35 and 36). These charts were prepared on August 
8, 1986, the day following McCorvey's accident, from notes Peterson had supposedly 
taken the date of the accident but thrown away. (R. 2998, p. 54). Against this 
testimony, the jury heard and weighed not only the previously cited testimony of 
motorists who drove the project and repeatedly said that the signs Peterson claimed were 
in place were not there, but the jury also heard Utah Highway Patrol officer Lyle Evans, 
who drove to the accident scene from the north and arrived approximately 30 minutes 
16(R. 3004, pp. 13-14; R. 3009, p. 117; R. 3003, p. 16; R. 3006, pp. 76-77; R. 3006, 
pp. 193-194, 210; R. 3007, pp. 11-12; R. 3007, p. 51; R. 3007, p. 70; R. 3007, pp. 85, 91-92; 
R. 3007, pp. 120-121, 127; R. 3007, p. 150, 153-154; R. 3007, pp. 167-168, 173). 
17For ease of comparison, Defs' Ex. 115 and Plf s Ex. 17 are included in the Addendum 
as Exhibits 13 and 14 respectively. 
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after the accident, say that he had no memory of seeing an early warner near the accident 
scene. (R. 3007, pp. 10-11). 
The jury likewise heard from several LeGrand Johnson employees whose testimony 
contradicted Peterson's. One such employee was Carol Christensen, whom Peterson 
picked up and drove to the accident scene ten or twenty minutes afterwards. (R. 3004, 
p. 130; R. 2998, p. 44). Peterson left Ms. Christensen at the accident scene and told her 
that he was going to check the signs "so that the company wouldn't get in trouble." (R. 
3004, p. 131). Another employee, David Merchant, testified that his job was to place 
the traffic control signs. (R. 3006, p. 167). Merchant said that just prior to the accident, 
none of the lanes of traffic on 1-15 were closed to motorists. (Id, at 75). Merchant also 
said that before McCorvey's accident he had taken the Right Lane Closed Ahead signs 
and "leaned them over on the side of the road so they couldn't be seen [by motorists]." 
(Id,, at 75). Merchant also said that UDOT inspector Berry told him where to put the 
signs. (Id, at 78). 
Merchant stated too that the early warner was miles north of the accident scene up 
by the rest area. (Id. at 77). Merchant's testimony about the placement of the early 
warner was corroborated by Wayne Holdaway, who ran the roller for LeGrand Johnson. 
Holdaway stated that there was an early warner located by the rest area near mile post 
137. (R. 3007, p. 47). Likewise, the flagger, Allen Syddall, remembered seeing only 
one early warner, up by the rest area. (R. 3007, pp. 69-70).18 
18Peterson also marked on these charts the locations of his workmen, including his two 
flaggers. Interestingly, there is no flagger shown on the roadway where Syddall claimed to have 
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Next, Peterson's credibility on the issue of signing was impeached by officer Max 
Shields' investigative notes and by Webster's photographs. An hour after the accident, 
officer Shields started his investigation which consisted of noting the location of the 
traffic control signs then on the project. (R. 3006, pp. 157 and 199). Shields marked 
an early warner in approximately the same location that Webster had observed one, but 
Shields did not note a second early warner although he drove as far as the rest area 
several miles north of the accident scene. Q$L at 198-99). 
While Peterson claimed that he was driving the project checking the signs 
following McCorvey's accident, Webster took a photograph at the accident scene in 
which Peterson appeared in the background. (R. 2998, p. 90; Plf s Exhibit 3n). 
Similarly, although Peterson claimed there were Do Not Pass signs through the project, 
including on both sides of the road at mile post 136, Webster's photographs show no such 
signs placed so that motorists could see them. (Plf s Ex. 3d). But Webster's photographs 
did show a Do Not Pass sign in the vicinity of mile post 136 leaned against a delineator 
post at the side of the roadway so that it could not be seen by motorists. (R. 3004, p. 
68; R. 2998, p. 88; Plf s Ex. 3e).19 Webster's photographs also caught LeGrand 
Johnson in the process of moving early warners. (Plf s Exs. 59, 53, 3x; R. 2998, pp. 
124-25). 
been positioned when the accident happened. (Plf s Exs. 35 & 35x). 
19This photograph, Plf s Ex. 3e, is included in the Addendum at § 15. For the Court's 
convenience, the inconspicious sign is denoted with a blue arrow. 
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Finally, the jury heard about lawyer P. K. Peterson and his role in the coverup. 
Superintendent Steven Peterson called LeGrand Johnson company headquarters on August 
7, 1986, to advise them of the McCorvey accident. (R. 2998, p. 79). The next morning, 
the same day on which Steve Peterson supposedly prepared the exhibit showing sign 
placement and workmen throughout the project, P. K. Peterson, an attorney employed 
by Johnson's insurance company, came to the accident scene. With Steve Peterson's 
assistance, lawyer Peterson proceeded to photograph the project. Before taking these 
photographs, however, some major alterations were made to the accident scene. For 
example, lawyer Peterson photographed the roadway at the point at which McCorvey's 
vehicle left the highway, but before this photograph was taken, the gravel was broomed 
off the roadway! (R. 2998, pp. 85-87; Plf s Ex. 54). Likewise, lawyer Peterson 
photographed 1-15 at or near mile post 136 looking south towards the accident scene. 
This was the same view which Webster had photographed the day before. In Webster's 
photograph there are no Do Not Pass signs, but in lawyer P. K. Peterson's photograph, 
the Do Not Pass signs are mysteriously up and in place! d i . at 87-89; Plf s Ex. 3fx & 
20For the Court's convenience, Webster's photograph of the roadway where McCorvey 
entered the median, Plf s Ex. 3m, is included in the Addendum at § 16, followed immediately 
by § 17, which contains Plf s Ex. 54, the photograph lawyer P. K. Peterson took after the 
roadway had been swept. Plf s Ex. 3f, Webster's photograph taken in the vicinity of mile post 
136 showing no Do Not Pass signs is included in the Addendum at § 18, followed immediately 
by Addendum § 19 containing P. K. Peterson's photograph, Plf s Ex. 57, taken the next day and 
showing the erected signs. McCorvey correctly pointed out to the jury that these and other acts 
of covering up on behalf of UDOT and LeGrand Johnson were perhaps the best evidence of their 
wrongdoing. (R. 3008, pp. 109-111). 
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F. Evidence About UDOT'S Defective Traffic Control Plan. 
UDOT's Opening Brief is likewise woefully lacking in evidence about the defective 
traffic control plan which it required LeGrand Johnson to use on this project. A traffic 
control plan that did not meet the minimum requirements of the Manual on Uniform 
Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways ("MUTCD"). 
The MUTCD is a federal manual governing traffic control on interstate highways. 
UDOT has adopted the MUTCD. (Plf s Ex. 80; Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-20 and 41-6-
21). UDOT's Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction governed this 
project and these regulations also required that "all signs, barricades and channeling 
devices shall be constructed and erected in accordance with the plans and the Manual on 
Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways . . . " (Plf s Ex. 9, § 625). 
LeGrand Johnson's contract likewise provided that the contractor had to design and 
implement a traffic control plan which "shall comply with MUTCD requirements." (Plf s 
Ex. 8, § 405.09; Add. § 6). 
UDOT's project engineer, Richard Griffin, recognized that traffic control on a 
construction project was important to protect the public. (R. 3004, p. 154). Griffin even 
understood that the contract required signing on this particular project to be done in 
compliance with the MUTCD. QcLatl53). But this did not occur. Griffin did not refer 
to MUTCD because UDOT had its own traffic control plan for this project. QfL at 
152).21 
21UDOT's Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction specifically 
provided the MUTCD "shall govern in any matter not included in these specifications." (Plf s 
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Instead of LeGrand Johnson drawing up a traffic control plan that complied with 
the MUTCD, UDOT gave the contractor a traffic control plan. (R. 2998, p. 117). 
LeGrand Johnson could not change the plan without UDOT's written approval. (R. 
3008, p. 18). UDOT's own experts conceded that this plan did not comply with the 
MUTCD. (R. 3006, p. 230).22 More importantly, McCorvey's traffic engineering 
expert, Edward Ruzak, testified that this inadequate traffic control plan was a proximate 
cause of the accident. (R. 2999, pp. 43-44). 
It was Ruzak's opinion that the MUTCD gave a specific example of how traffic 
should have been controlled on this very type of project. (LL at 50-51). This example, 
PIf s Exhibit 39, showed proper traffic control for daytime maintenance operations on a 
four-lane divided road when half of the roadway or one lane was being closed due to 
maintenance. (R. 2998, pp. 193-194). This was the type of traffic control plan which 
the contract called for under the MUTCD, and according to Ruzak, this MUTCD plan 
Ex. 9, § 624.02). Superintendent Peterson nevertheless said that he did not have to comply with 
the MUTCD under any circumstances. (R. 2998, p. 118). UDOT's man on the scene in charge 
of safety, Curtis Berry, had no experience with the MUTCD other than having seen it once, and 
he did not have a copy of the MUTCD with him on the project. (R. 3005, pp. 132-133). 
22The significance of UDOT not using the MUTCD standards cannot be overemphasized. 
UDOT's traffic control expert witnesses testified that the MUTCD sets forth the minimum 
standards of traffic control and that while more than the minimum standards may be required 
in a given situation, one should never do less than that required by the MUTCD. (R. 2998, pp. 
180-181; R. 3006, pp. 239-240; PIf s Ex. 38). In this case, the overwhelming evidence was that 
UDOT's plan failed to meet the minimum safety standards required by the MUTCD. 
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would have kept motorists out of the unswept lane and controlled them in single file in 
the -completed lane" until they had cleared the project. GdL at S2-43).23 
One only need compare these two plans to see how this accident occurred and 
could have been prevented. The defective UDOT plan uses two early warners placed in 
the middle of an interstate freeway lane to close many miles of freeway to traffic. (Plf s 
Ex. 10). UDOTs expert witnesses, Peter Holton and Richard Leuttich, testified that they 
did not know of any principle of traffic control which allowed one to place the huge early 
warners in the middle of a freeway lane without any channelization devices steering 
motorists around the early warners, and they also said that as implemented, the UDOT 
traffic control plan was not effective to close the outside lane of 1-15 to traffic. (R. 2998, 
pp. 190, 196; R. 3006, p. 241).24 As if to remove any possible doubt that the defective 
UDOT traffic control plan had caused this accident, UDOT's expert Richard Leuttich 
stated that the presence of the Wright's Suburban in the closed lane adjacent to McCorvey 
was a "major" cause of the accident. (R. 3006, p. 237). 
Because of these defects in UDOT's plan, McCorvey's traffic engineer, Ruzak, 
testified that even if the signs which UDOT claims were in place were up, this sign 
2 JFor the Court's convenience, the defective UDOT traffic control plan (Plf s Ex. 10) 
and the MUTCD traffic control plan (Plf s Ex. 39) are included in the Addendum at 
respectively, §§ 20 and 21. 
24Both of these experts likewise agreed that the motorist would simply drive around the 
early warner and then go back into the closed lane. (R. 2998, p. 196; R. 3006, p. 242). UDOT 
expert Holton went so far as to say that if you "give a motorist an open lane, he or she will take 
it." Holton also said that once motorists are around the last early warner and "the lane appears 
open to them . . . most motorists would assume that there was no further need to stay out of 
that lane." (R. 2998, p. 196). 
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placement caused the accident. (R. 2999, p. 41). According to Ruzak, the signs 
allegedly in place at the time of the accident gave conflicting messages to motorists. For 
instance, even assuming there were Do Not Pass signs in place as UDOT claims, the 
interstate was posted at 55 miles per hour, and both lanes were open to traffic. Thus, 
motorists were still passing and would continue to pass because they had the ability to 
pass in both open lanes.25 Based on the conflicting messages, there was confusion and 
chaos among the motorists on the highway. Ruzak stated that he would expect motorists 
to respond exactly as the Wrights, Taylor, McCorvey and the other motorists did. Ruzak 
said that in his opinion every motorist thought he or she was doing the right thing. They 
all interpreted whatever they thought was right from the signs, but they were all doing 
something different. In short, there was no control and no positive guidance. (R. 2999, 
pp. 45-49).26 
25Richard Griffin's explanation for the use of Do Not Pass signs on eight miles of multi-
lane freeway north of mile post 136 that had been previously chip sealed, swept and completed 
brought chortles of laughter from the jury. Griffin said that motorists in both lanes could drive 
at speeds of 55 mph, but they could not pass. The motorists could drive abreast of each other, 
and they could change lanes, but they could not pass. If a motorist driving 55 came upon a 
slower vehicle or a vehicle stopped in the roadway, he or she could not pass. The Do Not Pass 
signs had nothing to do with keeping motorists out of a closed lane. These signs were there to 
prevent motorists from passing. (R. 3005, pp. 44-47). But under examination by McCorvey's 
counsel, Griffin admitted that he expected motorists to pass despite the Do Not Pass signs. QcL 
at 47). UDOT's traffic control expert Holton said that he had never seen Do Not Pass signs 
used in this manner. (R. 2998, p. 198). 
26UDOT's own expert witnesses were very critical of the traffic control plan used on this 
project. Traffic engineer Richard Leuttich not only said that the UDOT plan deviated from the 
MUTCD, but Leuttich grinned at the jury and admitted that he would not have signed the project 
in this manner. (R. 3006, pp. 229, 239; R. 3008, 112). Nevertheless, it was Leuttich's opinion 
that UDOT's traffic control plan was adequate because it moved in excess of 2,000 vehicles a 
day "very successfully for the entire length of the project and the entire duration of the project." 
(R. 3006, pp. 228-229). On cross-examination, however, Leuttich acknowledged that all of the 
traffic did not successfully negotiate the construction project. Leuttich grudgingly conceded that 
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Ruzak's opinions were shared by McCorvey's accident reconstructionist, Ernest 
Klein. Klein believed that confusing signing contributed to this accident in addition to 
the gravel and road conditions. (R. 3002, p. 33). Klein said there was chaos on the road 
that day. Chaos existed because the motorists were not told how to drive through the 
construction project. There were mixed directions. There were 55 mph signs. There 
was also a 25 mph sign. Some motorists drove on the unswept portion of the road at 
speeds of 55 and more, while others drove on both lanes at 25 or 35 miles per hour. QgL 
at 33-34). It was Klein's opinion that all the drivers on the road that day acted to the best 
of their ability and believed that they were acting reasonably. Klein was quick to point 
out that the motorists were frustrated and angry because no one said what was reasonable 
on this road. When Klein was asked his opinion about the cause of the accident that put 
McCorvey in a wheelchair, he said it was the "lack of positive guidance, it is the lack of 
clear marking and control of the road, and it is these mounds of gravel that caused Mr. 
McCorvey to drive off the road." dg\ at 36-37). 
G. Evidence About The Alleged Road Race. 
UDOT's contention that the accident was caused by a high speed road race 
between a family with children in a twelve passenger Suburban van and a small Honda 
Civic is not supported by the evidence. The Wrights all denied that they were engaged 
in a race with McCorvey. (R. 3007, pp. 85, 121, 149). Villarreal, the truck driver who 
witnessed the accident, stated that McCorvey was driving approximately 50 to 55 mph 
McCorvey and Page had "slid a ways" through the construction area. (Ji at 235-236). 
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prior to the accident. (R. 3004, pp. 7, 34). Based upon the investigating Highway Patrol 
officers measurements and report, McCorvey's accident reconstructionist determined that 
McCorvey was traveling between 52 and 62 miles per hour when he left the highway.27 
Rather than a road race as UDOT claims, the evidence shows that McCorvey's 
Honda was bombarded, pummeled and machine gunned by gravel and debris thrown by 
the Wrights when they pulled abreast of Mm in the outside lane. UDOT's witnesses 
testified that under these circumstances it was unreasonable for McCorvey to stay abreast 
of the Wrights and endure that kind of punishment. According to these witnesses, his 
only reasonable options were to stay ahead of the Wrights or to drop back. McCorvey 
tried to stay ahead of the Wrights and could not. When he tried to drop back out of the 
blast zone, he lost control.28 
27That report was done by Utah Highway Patrol officer Max Shields. (R. 3006, p. 123). 
The jury heard how several years after he had retired, officer Shields returned to the accident 
scene with LeGrand Johnson's counsel, UDOT's counsel, and the following UDOT expert 
witnesses: Robert Galloway, Richard Leuttich, Arthur Geurts and Newell Knight. (Id, at 205-
206). The jury also heard how during this visit, with the assistance of UDOT's expert 
witnesses, officer Shields supposedly found a 60 foot error in his measurement which would 
cause an accident reconstructionist to calculate a higher rate of speed for McCorvey's Honda at 
the point the car left the roadway. (Id, 207-208; R. 3010, p. 97). 
28,tBlast zone" is an appropriate term. Webster took a photograph, Plaintiffs Ex. 3cc, 
which shows what McCorvey encountered near the place where he lost control of the Honda. 
This photograph, taken facing north and showing that section of roadway where McCorvey lost 
control, clearly shows the blast of dirt, dust and debris being thrown by a truck in the outside 
lane. (Plf s Ex. 3cc; Add. § 22). 
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H. Evidence About The Unconstitutionality Of The Statutory Damage Cap. 
The jury awarded Daniel McCorvey $1,500,000 in general damages and 
$3,921,282 in special damages. Of this later figure, $795,609 represented the present 
value of Daniel's future wage loss, $131,551 represented his past medical costs, and 
$2,366,378 represented the present value of what it would take to meet his future medical 
and health care needs. The trial court reduced UDOT's share of this award to the 
statutory limit of $250,000. Daniel McCorvey's appeal challenges the constitutionality 
of the statutory cap. For purposes of this issue, three categories of facts are important. 
The first — UDOT's efforts to skew the jury verdict by accepting responsibility for this 
accident — has already been discussed. The other two categories of facts — the nature 
and extent of Daniel's injuries and UDOT's deliberate destruction of the insurance 
coverage which would have protected McCorvey — are addressed hereinbelow. 
1. UDOT Has Destroyed Daniel MfcQrvey Physically As Well As 
Financially And Taken From Him Virtually Every Fundamental Right 
Enjoyed By A Human Being, 
Daniel McCorvey is paralyzed from the neck down as a result of two fractured 
vertebrae sustained in the accident. (R. 3005, pp. 141-142). Because he is a quadri-
plegic, Daniel McCorvey is imprisoned in a body over which he has no control. In 
describing his condition, Bruce Sorenson, the neurosurgeon who treated Daniel, said "I 
think it is such a devastating injury for someone to be usually mentally alert and able to 
function mentally and not have anything else really to go with it." (IdL at 146-147). Dr. 
Sorenson also told the jury about the devastating financial and emotional problems such 
an injury causes the quadriplegic's family. He likened dealing with a quadriplegic such 
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as Daniel McCorvey to "having two young babies in your home that you have to take 
cane of the rest of your life." Id. at 146-147. 
Dr. Randall France, a psychiatrist and the pain specialist who treated Daniel 
McCorvey, testified that Daniel suffers from a central pain disorder because of his spinal 
cord injury. (R. 2998, pp. 8-9). Dr. France described this pain as similar to having a 
dentist drill into a nerve, and he said Daniel would experience this pain forever. QxL at 
10-12). Dr. France's medical plans for Daniel "are to maintain him on opiate 
medications." (Id at 13). Daniel McCorvey was medicated with opiates throughout the 
trial because of his pain. (R. 3003, p. 6). Daniel testified that the pain he was 
experiencing felt "like somebody's put kerosene on me and has put a match to me." (Id 
at p. 6). 
Judy Mallory is Daniel McCorvey's fiance. Judy Mallory is Daniel's only family. 
(R. 3000, p. 110). They were engaged to be married before his paralysis. Judy lives 
with Daniel and has taken care of him since the accident. She described their life 
together, past, present and future. Before this accident, Judy said that Daniel: 
[W]as bright, he was happy, he was friendly. He loved to partici-
pate in sports. He was a cyclist, an avid cyclist. He used to ride up 
Emigration Canyon almost on a daily basis. He sailed, he flew 
planes, he scuba dived. We enjoyed dancing. He had lots of 
friends. He's a wonderful person. He's a wonderful man. 
(Id at 100). 
Since the accident, Judy Mallory described Daniel as "hopeless": 
He's in a great deal of pain all of the time, emotional and physical 
pain. He has very little self-worth. He doesn't really have a will to 
live. He's talked of suicide numerous times. He's in so much pain, 
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you know. . . . He's changed. I mean he's not the same man I 
used to know. 
(LI at 100-01). 
July Mallory also told the jury how she and Daniel shared a bed without physical 
love. (IsL at 101). Then she explained, without tears, without emotion and in a soft, 
resigned voice how she shops and cleans for Daniel, bathes him and even assists him in 
something so personal and intimate as a bowel movement: 
He has to be digitally stimulated, which means basically we get into the TV 
room, he moves from one chair to the open commode that we have, and we 
have a bucket underneath. And I help him move over into the commode, 
and then I don a glove and lubricant, and have to put my finger up his 
rectum and help him have a bowel movement. 
(R. 3000, p. 103). 
Finally, Judy Mallory described for the jury how she and Daniel before the 
accident had planned to marry, have their own careers and raise a family. Q<L at 108-
109). She then told how Daniel's paralysis had changed everything. When asked why 
they were not married, she responded, "Daniel doesn't want to marry me if he's in a 
wheelchair." ( R at 111). 
UDOT did not contest Daniel McCorvey's physical injuries. Nor did UDOT 
contest Daniel's economic injuries. Daniel's total financial losses are staggering because 
Daniel has the most extensive level of paralysis. Qd^atQl). Daniel's health care needs 
are also staggering, over $55,000 annually. (Id. at 87; Plf s Ex. 50). Daniel McCorvey 
had already incurred out-of-pocket medical bills of $131,551. (1^ at 24). Dr. Randle, 
an economist, calculated that the present value of Daniel McCorvey's future medical 
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needs was $2,366,376, with the present value of his future equipment needs at $492,102. 
OlL at 25). 
Dr. Randle prepared four estimates of Daniel McCorvey's future income losses 
based upon what he believed would have been the four probable career paths Daniel could 
have taken, among which was his desire to enlist in the army as a warrant officer. (IdL. 
at 12; Plf s Exs. 70 & 73). Dr. Randle's valuation of Daniel's wage loss had he followed 
his dream and become a military pilot, was $795,609.29 (Id at 22-23). 
Altogether, Dr. Randle valued Daniel McCorvey's past and future out-of-pocket 
losses at $3,921,282. (IdL at 26). The jury returned a verdict for special damages in that 
amount. (R. 2523). The jury thus awarded Daniel McCorvey the full amount of the 
wages he would have lost as a military pilot plus his future and past medical expenses. 
2. UDOT Required LeGrand Johnson To Furnish Insurance To Protect 
McCorvey And Other Members Of The Traveling Public, Then By 
Its Actions Took That Coverage Away. 
To protect Daniel McCorvey and other members of the public from LeGrand 
Johnson's potential negligence, UDOT Regulations required the contractor to provide 
insurance. {Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction, Reg. 107.14; R. 
2642; Add. § 5). With two policies, primary and umbrella, LeGrand Johnson obtained 
insurance coverage of $6,000,000 on this project. (R. 2634, 2635). These policies 
would have compensated Daniel for his losses but for UDOT's actions. By intentionally 
shouldering the responsibility for this accident, UDOT shifted 28 percent of the fault 
29The military career path was among the lowest paying career options available to 
Daniel McCorvey. (Plf s Ex. 73). 
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from LeGrand Johnson on to the State of Utah. Then UDOT unashamedly appeared 
before the trial court and asked that its proportionate share of damages be reduced to the 
statutory maximum of $250,000. (R. 2594). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
UDOT has not marshaled the evidence supporting the jury's verdict, so its 
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence must fail. Moreover, there was more than 
sufficient evidence to support the verdict. At a minimum, the evidence showed that 
UDOT accepted responsibility for safety on the project, that it created the traffic control 
plan for the project, which did not conform to minimum safety requirements, that UDOT 
directed the contractor's work, that UDOT was negligent in failing to see that the 
contractor followed the safety requirements of the contract, in failing to provide sufficient 
signs to guide and control motorists and in failing to close the unswept lane to traffic, and 
that UDOT undertook the duty to sweep the chip-sealed lanes. The evidence further 
showed that had UDOT fulfilled its safety responsibilities properly, the accident never 
would have happened. From all this, the jury could reasonably conclude that UDOT's 
negligence was greater than McCorvey's, that it was a proximate cause of McCorvey's 
injuries and that UDOT's negligence was not superseded by the foreseeable, intervening 
negligence of the other parties. 
The evidence also supported the trial court's giving of a sudden peril instruction. 
UDOT's claim that such an instruction is inconsistent with comparative fault was not 
raised below and is wrong on the merits. Moreover, any error in giving the instruction 
was harmless because the jury was instructed in effect to ignore the instruction if it found 
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that McCorvey was responsible for the sudden peril, and the jury is presumed to follow 
the instructions. 
Finally, the trial court erred in reducing the judgment against UDOT to $250,000 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 because that statute is unconstitutional. It 
abridges an injured person's right to a remedy under article I, section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution. It also violates McCorvey's rights to due process, equal protection, and a 
jury trial under the Utah Constitution. 
ARGUMENT: UDOTS INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE CLAIMS 
MUST FAIL BECAUSE UDOT HAS NOT MAKSHATIFD THE 
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE JURY'S FINDINGS. 
UDOT's Brief shows what a fine job an appellant can do when it is not constrained 
by minor details, like presenting all the evidence supporting the jury's verdict. 
Unfortunately, UDOT was not free to ignore that evidence. The burden of overturning 
a factual findings "is a heavy one, reflective of the fact that [an appellate court does] not 
sit to retry cases . . . ." In re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). To 
show that the evidence is insufficient to support a jury's verdict, UDOT was required to 
marshall all the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence 
was still insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Crookston 
v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991). UDOT cannot simply argue selected 
evidence favorable to its position. Id. at 800. When, as here, the appellant fails to 
marshal the evidence, that alone is grounds to reject its attack on the sufficiency of the 
evidence. Id.; Evans ex rel Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460, 469 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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The reviewing court will assume that the record supports the verdict. See Saunders v. 
Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991).30 
ARGUMENT: UDOT'S NEGLIGENCE WAS A SUBSTANTIAL 
FACTOR IN CAUSING THE ACCIDENT 
UDOT claims that its negligence was not a substantial factor in bringing about the 
accident. UDOT apparendy concedes that its negligence was a cause in fact of Daniel 
McCorvey's injuries but argues that it was not a "substantial causative factorH because 
its negligence in approving a deficient traffic control plan was dwarfed by the following 
acts of negligence by McCorvey, Wright and LeGrand Johnson: (1) the contractor's 
failure to have in place all the signs required by the plan; (2) McCorvey's speeding and 
passing in disregard of warnings and observed conditions and his failure to slow down 
when challenged by Wright; (3) Wright's speeding and illegal passing in disregard of 
posted warnings and observed conditions; (4) LeGrand Johnson's failure to remove 
clumps of loose gravel from the left lane; and (5) McCorvey's turn once in the median. 
But this argument ignores the fact that McCorvey alleged and proved more than this 
single act of negligence against UDOT, that the jury found UDOT to be more negligent 
than either Wright or McCorvey (in fact, more negligent than Wright and McCorvey 
combined) and that there was overwhelming evidence supporting the jury's finding. 
JOMcCorvey has marshaled the evidence supporting the jury's verdict in a Digest of the 
Trial Transcript, which is contained in the Addendum at § 23. This Digest does not contain 
evidence related to issues that UDOT has not challenged on appeal. Even in an abbreviated 
format, this evidence consists of almost 150 pages; far too many pages to include in McCorvey's 
Brief. 
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UDOT also ignores the fact that there can be more than one proximate cause of 
an accident.31 UDOT's negligence may be a proximate cause of McCorvey's injuries 
even though other causes may have joined in producing the injuries. More important, 
UDOT ignores the fact that its negligence was directly responsible for at least four of the 
five contributing factors it identifies. UDOT, for example, furnished the contractor with 
the defective traffic plan that was used on the project, UDOT required LeGrand Johnson 
to follow that plan, and UDOT's inadequate plan was a proximate cause of the accident 
(supra., at pp. 29-33). If all the signs called for by the UDOT plan were not in place, 
it was UDOT's fault for not requiring LeGrand Johnson to comply with the plan and for 
not providing LeGrand Johnson with the necessary signs.32 UDOT must likewise share 
responsibility for failing to remove clumps of gravel from the left lane since UDOT's 
project engineer was responsible for directing the removal of surplus material from the 
roadway, UDOT inspected the project daily, and UDOT undertook the duty to sweep the 
road (supra., at pp. 11-13). 
With respect to the allegations about speeding, the evidence, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict, was that McCorvey was traveling between 50 and 
62 mph at the time of the accident. (R. 3003, p. 100; R. 3002, p. 28). UDOT's own 
31See Marsh v. Irvine, 22 Utah 2d 154, 449 P.2d 996, 998 (1969). Thus, the mere fact 
that others may also have been negligent — even more negligent than UDOT — does not mean 
that UDOT's negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident. See Monzo v. Common-
wealth, Dep't of Tramp., 556 A.2d 493, 495 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (proximate cause does 
not refer to a degree of negligence), appeal granted. 567 A.2d 655 (Pa. 1989) (table). 
32Berry, UDOT's inspector, testified that he was responsible for implementing the traffic 
control plan and that he could stop the project if LeGrand Johnson did things improperly (supraT, 
at pp. 11-12). 
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project engineer, Richard Griffin, said that cars could travel safely in the unswept, 
outside lane at 55 mph and that he even encouraged motorists to drive 55 mph on this 
project. (R. 3004, p. 197). Thus, if McCorvey was speeding at all, his speeding was 
minimal. If McCorvey and the other motorists were driving too fast for conditions, this 
would not excuse UDOT because all the motorists said that there were no flaggers, no 
adequate signs warning them of the dangerous conditions which they encountered on the 
roadway at the accident scene and nothing telling them at what speed to drive through the 
project (supra., at pp. 19-22). UDOT thus provided no positive guidance to these and 
other motorists. 
As for McCorvey's allegedly illegal passing, the evidence was disputed about 
whether there were any Do Not Pass signs or early warners near the scene of the accident 
(supra., at pp. 22-28). But even if these signs were there, UDOT's witnesses admitted 
that they would expect motorists to pass when both lanes of the road were open, as they 
were here. From all the evidence, a reasonable jury could well conclude, as Ernest 
Klein, McCorvey's accident reconstructionist did, that all the motorists, including 
McCorvey and Wright, reacted as best they could to the conditions UDOT created.33 
33The only factor that UDOT has identified for which it arguably was not responsible 
is McCorvey's alleged negligence in trying to turn back onto the highway once his car was in 
the median. However, since UDOT's negligence caused McCorvey's car to leave the road in 
the first place, it is not absolved of liability merely because McCorvey might have been able to 
avoid serious injuries if he had not panicked and completely lost control of his car. Cf. Peterson 
v. Department of Transp., 399 N.W.2d 414, 418 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (department of 
transportation could be liable for motorist's injuries caused when motorist's car left road and 
struck a tree where the motorist left the road only because of a defect in the road), appeal denied 
(Mich. 1987). It was for the jury to decide whether McCorvey's reactions when he found 
himself in the median were negligent and, if so, whether his negligence was so much greater 
than UDOT's as to relieve UDOT from responsibility for the accident. The jury rejected 
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UDOT claims that the presence of thick patches of excess loose gravel on the 
inside lane was "the most predominant force" in causing the accident (Brief at 39) and 
that this created a high likelihood of physical harm to drivers, especially those, like 
McCorvey, in small, lightweight cars. (M. at 42). Incredibly, UDOT insists on holding 
LeGrand Johnson responsible for this gravel on the roadway, which is to ignore all of the 
evidence showing that not only did UDOT create the hazardous condition caused by the 
gravel, but UDOT allowed the gravel to remain on the roadway. Other courts have not 
hesitated to find that the negligence of a state transportation department was a proximate 
cause of injury when it failed to correct similar hazardous conditions on the roadway or 
otherwise failed to warn motorists of such conditions. £eg, e.g.. Dubois v. State Farm 
Ins. Co., 571 So.2d 201, 204 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (jury properly found department of 
transportation 80% at fault for permitting an abundance of loose gravel on a black top 
surface), writ denied, 575 So.2d 367 (La. 1991); Boccarossa v. Department ofTransp., 
475 N.W.2d 390, 392 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (reversing trial court finding that another 
driver was sole proximate cause of the accident when evidence suggested that department 
of transportation should have made the area in question a no passing zone); Jordan v. 
Jones, 331 S.E.2d 662, 663-64 (N.C. 1985) (department of transportation's failure to 
comply with MUTCD presented a jury question on the issue of negligence and 
UDOT's argument. UDOT's own accident reconstruction expert, Newell Knight, testified that 
McCorvey had not acted unreasonably in this emergency situation. (See infra at p. 49). 
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causation).34 It was for the jury to decide whether UDOT's negligence had more than 
"an insignificant effect" in producing McCorvey's injuries. Given all the evidence, 
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, this court cannot say, as a matter 
of law, that UDOT's negligence was not a proximate cause of McCorvey's injuries. 
ARGUMENT: THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE OTHER PARTIES 
WAS NOT A SUPERSEDING CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT 
UDOT also argues that two intervening forces - the negligence of LeGrand 
Johnson in failing to remove the loose gravel from the inside lane, and McCorvey and 
Wright's "high-speed road race" through the resurfacing project — were superseding 
causes of the accident and therefore cut off its liability. But "a person's negligence is not 
superseded by the negligence of another if the subsequent negligence of another is 
foreseeable." Harris v. Utah Transit Auth., 671 P.2d 217, 219 (Utah 1983). See also 
Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240, 246 (Utah 1985); Jensen v. Mountain States 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 611 P.2d 363, 365-66 (Utah 1980). Ordinarily, the foreseeability of the 
subsequent negligent conduct of a third person "must be resolved by the finder of fact." 
Jensen, 611 P.2d at 365. Although UDOT did not request a jury instruction on 
superseding cause, the court gave such an instruction. (R. 2567). UDOT did not object 
34For other cases imposing upon the state a duty to correct or warn of hazardous 
conditions on roadways see Hood v. State, 587 So.2d 755, 758 (La. Ct. App.) writ denied. 590 
So.2d 81, 82 (La. 1991); Brown v. State, 572 So.2d 1058, 1061, 1063-64 (La. Ct. App. 1990), 
clarified. 577 So.2d 1226 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied. 581 So.2d 710 (La. 1991); Monzo, 556 
A.2d at 495; State v. McBride, 601 S.W.2d 552, 556, 557 (Tex. Civ. App.), error refused, 
n.r.e. (Tex. 1980). The trial court properly instructed the jury with respect to the law governing 
UDOT's duty to correct or warn of hazardous conditions on the roadway. (R. 2553). UDOT 
never objected to the instruction. Nor does UDOT claim that the trial court misstated the law 
in that instruction. 
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to the instruction and does not claim that the trial court misstated the law. The jury was 
properly instructed on the issue of superseding cause and necessarily found that UDOT 
could reasonably foresee the negligent acts of Johnson, McCorvey and Wright. 
UDOT created a chaotic situation in which motorists could pass each other on a 
road covered with excessive gravel at speeds of 55 mph. UDOT's project engineer, 
Richard Griffin, admitted that these conditions would cause agitation in drivers, and every 
motorist on that highway described his or her anger at the situation they encountered. 
Under these circumstances, it was certainly foreseeable that as one car overtook another 
under these conditions, either one or both would get bombarded with gravel and try to 
take evasive action to avoid further damage. It was certainly foreseeable that, in doing 
so, a driver might lose control of his car. The fact that the car that lost control was in 
the supposedly swept lane does not relieve UDOT from liability. QL Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 435(1) ("If the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about 
harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen . . . the 
manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable"). More important-
ly, the jury could have reasonably concluded that UDOT itself was responsible for the 
mounds of loose gravel in the inside lane. UDOTs engineer testified that he wanted 
excess gravel on the road. UDOT inspected the project regularly and knew or should 
have known of the excess gravel. UDOT was responsible for directing the removal of 
excess gravel and assumed the duty of sweeping the roadway. 
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ARGUMENT: THE JURY'S APPORTIONMENT OF FAULT BETWEEN 
McCORVEY AND UDOT WAS SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
UDOT claims that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's 
finding of negligence on McCorvey's part, no jury could have found that UDOT's failure 
to adopt a traffic control plan making a high-speed, side-by-side road race impossible was 
more culpable than McCorvey's voluntary engagement in such a chase. But the court 
must view the evidence not simply in the light most favorable to the appellant's position 
but to the jury's verdict as a whole, and the jury found UDOT more negligent — in fact, 
nearly three times more negligent — than McCorvey. Obviously, in apportioning only 
10 percent of the fault to McCorvey and 12 percent to Wright, the jury did not accept 
UDOT's story that this was a high-speed road race over known, hazardous conditions. 
Rather, the jury saw McCorvey, Wright and the other motorists' conduct as a foreseeable 
reaction to the chaotic and confused situation which UDOT had created (supra., pp. 29-
34). Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to its verdict, the jury was 
clearly justified in finding McCorvey's negligence less than UDOT's. 
ARGUMENT: ITnOT FATTFD TO PROPERLY 
OBJECT TO THE SUDDEN PERIL INSTRUCTION 
Under Utah law, a party's objections to proposed jury instructions must be specific 
enough to give the trial court notice of "every error in the instructions which is 
complained of on appeal." Snyderville Transp. Co., 609 P.2d at 942. The sudden peril 
instruction was number 33 in the packet given by the trial court. (R. 2562; Add. § 24). 
UDOT objected to the sudden peril instruction solely on the ground that it was not 
- 4 7 -
supported by the evidence. (R. 3013, pp. 9, 13 & 18). Now UDOT wishes to argue that 
this instruction was improper, as a matter of law, because the sudden peril doctrine was 
somehow extinguished by Utah's adoption of comparative fault. Not having raised this 
objection before the trial court, UDOT cannot do so on this appeal. £e£ Snyderville 
Transportation Co., 609 P.2d at 942; Jensen v. Eakins, 575 P.2d 179, 179-80 (Utah 
1978); Utah R. Civ. P. 51. 
Moreover, the argument is without merit. The sudden peril instruction is not a 
special negligence doctrine like the "last clear chance doctrineH that was extinguished with 
tort reform. Compare JIFU Ch. 15 (sudden peril instruction listed under "basic 
negligence concepts"), with JIFU Ch. 17 (last clear chance instruction listed under 
"special negligence doctrines"). A sudden peril instruction does not excuse fault. Unlike 
"last clear chance" and other doctrines which courts have found incompatible with 
comparative negligence, it merely clarifies the applicable standard for determining fault. 
It does not impose a lesser standard of care but is simply a specific application of the 
reasonable person standard to the context of emergency situations. As such, it is 
perfectly consistent with a comparative fault system. See Young v. Clark, 814 P.2d 364, 
365, 368 (Colo. 1991); Compton v. Pletch, 561 N.E.2d 803, 806-807 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1990), adopted. 580 N.E.2d 664) (Ind. 1991). 
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ARGUMENT: THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL 
COURTS GIVING OF A SUDDEN PERIL INSTRUCTION 
UDOT argues that it was prejudicial error to give the sudden peril instruction 
because there was no sudden peril or, if there was, it resulted from McCorvey's own 
negligence. It was not error, however, to give a sudden peril instruction if it was 
consistent with McCorvey's theory of the case and supported by some evidence. Hillier 
v. Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300, 302-3 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 
1987) (table). McCorvey's theory was that he was not negligent but was confronted with 
a sudden peril when the Wright van tried to pass him. McCorvey and the other motorists 
all testified that there was no warning of the hazards they encountered on the roadway 
and that they did not fully appreciate the danger until the accident took place. McCorvey 
also testified that the events leading up to the accident all occurred in less than two 
seconds. This evidence alone would have justified giving the instruction, but there was 
also evidence that McCorvey encountered a sudden emergency when he left the roadway. 
UDOT attempted at trial to make McCorvey's conduct in the median the 
superseding cause of the accident. (R. 3009, pp. 80-81; R. 3002, pp. 67-68; R. 3010, 
pp. 86-87). But UDOT's own accident reconstructionist, as well as McCorvey's, said 
that McCorvey faced emergency conditions in the median, that he was Mscared to death" 
and that his efforts to return to the roadway were reasonable. (R. 3010, pp. 107-08; R. 
3002, pp. 32-33, 67-68, 113-14). Given this evidence, it was "for the jury to determine 
whether an emergency existed." Redd v. Airway Motor Coach Lines, Inc., 104 Utah 9, 
137 P.2d 374, 378 (1943) (quoting Dobrow v. Hertz, 15 A.2d 749, 751 (N.J. 1940)). 
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Not only was there evidence to justify giving the instruction, but the fact that the 
jury found McCorvey negligent "does not nullify the propriety of the instruction.M 
Hillier, 740 P.2d at 303. Unless the trial court could have concluded as a matter of law 
that McCorvey's negligence was the cause of the sudden peril, it was not error to give 
the instruction. The evidence of McCorvey's negligence was disputed, making it a 
question for the jury. Under these circumstances, Utah courts have affirmed the giving 
of a sudden peril instruction even where the jury ultimately found the party requesting 
the instruction negligent. See, e ^ , id. (party found 20% negligent); Christiansen v. 
Utah Transit Auth., 649 P.2d 42, 44, 47 (Utah 1982) (parties found 30% negligent). 
Finally, any error in giving the instruction was harmless. The court instructed the 
jury that an emergency or sudden peril did not excuse or justify negligence "if the 
emergency or sudden peril was caused by that driver's own fault." (R. 2562). UDOT 
does not claim that the instruction does not accurately state the law. The jury is 
presumed to have followed the instructions. See, e.g.. Moore v. Burton Lumber & 
Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865, 869 (Utah 1981). Thus, if the jury found that McCorvey's 
negligence was a cause of the emergency or sudden peril,35 the court must assume that 
it ignored the sudden peril instruction and did not excuse McCorvey's conduct. 
35The jury could have found McCorvey negligent yet not responsible for the sudden peril 
if, for example, it found that McCorvey acted unreasonably only after his car left the road. 
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ARGUMENT: THE STATUTORY CAP ON DAMAGE AWARDS AGAINST 
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES OPIATES THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
In his cross-appeal, McCorvey challenges the constitutionality of section 63-30-34. 
At the time judgment was entered in this case, section 63-30-34 stated: 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), if a judgment for damages for 
personal injury against a governmental entity . . . exceeds $250,000 for one 
person or any one occurrence . . . , the court shall reduce the judgment that 
amount, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the injury 
is characterized as governmental. 
(3) The damage limits established in this section do not apply to damages 
awarded as compensation when a governmental entity has taken or damaged 
private property without just compensation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34(1) (1989).36 
In Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989), a majority of 
this Court held the Governmental Immunity Act's limits on tort recoveries against 
governmental entities unconstitutional as applied to the University Hospital.37 775 P.2d 
at 366 (per Durham, J.). Justices Durham and Zimmerman would have held that the 
36Section 63-30-34 was amended in 1991. The amendments are not significant to the 
issues raised in McCorvey's cross-appeal. 
31
 Condemarin involved the $100,000 limitation found in former sections 63-30-29 and -
34, which the main opinion referred to collectively as the Recovery limits statutes/ 775 P.2d 
at 348 n.l (per Durham, J.). Although Justice Durham intimated that a cap "large enough to 
compensate a majority of injuries (minor and serious) but not so large as to threaten or ensure 
[a public entity's] insolvency" might pass constitutional muster, id. at 363, Justice Zimmerman 
rejected Hany implication . . . that flat caps on damages lacking any differentiation between 
actual and general or punitive damages may be constitutional,- id. at 369. The majority's 
analysis did not appear to depend on any differences between the former statutory scheme and 
current section 63-30-34. See, e ^ , 775 P.2d at 370 n.l (Stewart, J., concurring) ("My analysis 
. . . is the same under either the current statute or its predecessorM). 
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recovery limits statutes and section 63-30-3,38 operating in conjunction, were unconstitu-
tional under a due process analysis. $££ id. at 364. Justice Stewart concluded that the 
damage cap was unconstitutional as applied to the University Hospital because it violated 
equal protection. Id- at 369. UDOT argued below, and the trial court agreed, that 
Condemarin was not controlling because its holding was limited to the University 
Hospital. (See R. at 2647-50, 2666-69). However, the reasoning in Condemarin 
supports the conclusion that the statutory cap is unconstitutional as applied in this case 
as well. 
Although they did not agree on the proper constitutional analysis, the three justices 
in the majority in Condemarin did agree on some points. First, they agreed that the right 
to a remedy for damages done to one's person was an important substantive right 
protected by article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution.39 See 755 P.2d at 357-58, 
360 (Durham, J.), 366-68 (Zimmerman, J.), & 372, 373 (Stewart, J.). Second, they 
agreed that the statutory cap on damages interferes with that right. See id. at 358, 363 
(Durham, J.), 368 (Zimmerman, J.) & 372 (Stewart, J.). Third, they agreed that, 
because the statute impinged on a constitutional right, the presumption that the statute is 
constitutional disappeared and heightened scrutiny was required. See M- at 354-56 
(Durham, J.), 368 (Zimmerman, J.) & 372, 373 (Stewart, J.). Fourth, they agreed that 
there was no basis for concluding that the damage cap was necessary to protect the 
38Section 63-30-3 extended to governmental entities immunity from suit for any injury 
resulting from the operation of a government-owned hospital. 
39That section provides that "every person, for an injury done to him in his person, . 
. . shall have remedy by due course of law . . . ." 
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stability of government or to preserve the public treasury. Ss£ id- at 363 (Durham, J.), 
368-69 (Zimmerman, J.) & 373-74 (Stewart, J.). Finally, they all agreed that the 
statutory cap, which places the burden of protecting the public treasury on those most 
seriously injured and hence most in need of financial protection, is an unjustified intrusion 
on the constitutional right to a remedy under article I, section 11. See 775 P.2d at 361, 
363-64 (Durham, J.), 366, 368 (Zimmerman, J.) & 369, 370, 374 (Stewart, J.). 
The damage cap clearly infringes on "the fundamental principle of American law 
that victims of wrongful or negligent acts should be compensated to the extent that they 
have been harmed. See id, at 354 (per Durham, J.). Under section 63-30-34 
McCorvey's remedy is limited to $250,000 - only about 6 percent of McCorvey's actual 
out-of-pocket losses. Given the views of a majority of this Court, such a serious 
limitation on the right of a seriously injured person to recover violates the Utah 
Constitution in several respects. 
Article I, section 24 is the Utah Constitution's equal protection provision. It 
states: "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform application/ The purpose of 
the provision is to assure that "persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, and 
persons in different circumstances should not be treated as if their circumstances were the 
same." Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984). Article I, section 24 is violated 
when "statutory classifications and the different treatment given the classes [are not] based 
on differences that have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the statute." 
Id. at 670. "When persons are similarly situated, it is unconstitutional to single out one 
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person or group of persons from among a larger class on the basis of a tenuous 
justification that has little or no merit/ Id- at 671. 
The statutory cap creates at least three classifications: (1) between plaintiffs whose 
injuries are minor and do not exceed the statutory cap and those whose injuries are 
serious and do exceed the statutory cap, (2) between victims of governmental tortfeasors 
and victims of nongovernmental tortfeasors, and (3) between victims of governmental 
negligence and victims of governmental takings. All are discriminatory on their face, and 
none is justified by the statute's apparent purpose. As the Court recognized in 
Condemarin, the first classification is unreasonable because it places on those most 
seriously injured, and hence most in financial need, the burden of protecting the public 
treasury without any basis for concluding that the burden they are unfairly required to 
bear will actually protect the treasury from unreasonable depletion. 775 P.2d at 353, 
361, 363 (Durham, J.), 367-69 (Zimmerman, J.) & 373-74 (Stewart, J.). 
Similarly, there is no basis for concluding that governmental tortfeasors are more 
in need of protection than private tortfeasors or that they are less able to insure against 
potentially costly liabilities. 
Finally, the distinction between victims of governmental negligence and victims 
of governmental takings is unreasonable. Under section 68-30-34, if the state took 
$1,000,000 from McCorvey's bank account it would be liable for the full amount, but if 
it takes away his life or, as in this case, everything that gave his life dignity and meaning, 
it never has to pay more than $250,000. If the state takes away McCorvey's home, it has 
to pay the full amount, but it can impose liability for millions of dollars in future medical 
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bills and never pay more than $250,000. Under the statute, the state could not take $1 
out of McCorvey's pay check without being fully liable, but it could take away his ability 
to make a living for the rest of his life and never pay more than $250,000. There is 
simply no rational basis for such distinctions. The statute, therefore, fails Utah's equal 
protection requirement. 
Second, the statutory cap violates the due process clause of the Utah Constitution, 
article I, section 7. The test of constitutionality under the due process clause is whether 
the statute has a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose and is neither arbitrary 
nor discriminatory. See Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 356 (per Durham, J.) (quoting Nebbia 
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934)). See also id. at 368 (Zimmerman, J.) (under 
a due process analysis, the court must weigh the particular infringement on protected 
interests against the justifications offered for the restriction). As noted above, the 
classifications drawn by section 63-30-34 are both arbitrary and discriminatory. 
Moreover, the burden the statute imposes on a seriously injured person's right of 
recovery is grossly disproportionate to any benefit the statute provides. A majority of the 
Court has already determined that the statute imposes an unreasonable burden on 
important constitutional rights. See id. at 363 (Durham, J.), 368 (Zimmerman, J.) & 374 
(Stewart, J.).40 Thus, the statute cannot withstand a due process challenge. 
40As Justice Zimmerman concluded, M[T]here can be no question that the legislation at 
issue, which severely restricts the right of every citizen to recover even actual out-of-pocket 
losses, . . . substantially infringes upon those interests specifically protected by article I, section 
11." 775 P.2d at 368 (citation omitted). 
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Third, the statutory cap violates the open courts provision of article I, section 11. 
Article I, section 11 precludes the state from arbitrarily depriving an individual of 
"effective remedies designed to protect basic individual rights." Berry ex rel. Berry v. 
Beech Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985). The test for constitutionality 
under article I, section 11 is essentially a due process analysis. Sfi£ 775 P.2d at 357 (per 
Durham, J.) & 367 & n.l (per Zimmerman, J.). 
[Sjection 11 is satisfied if the law provides an injured person an effective 
and reasonable alternative remedy "by due course of law" for vindication 
of his constitutional interest. The benefit provided by the substitute must 
be substantially equal in value or other benefit to the remedy abrogated in 
providing essentially comparable substantive protection to one's person, [or] 
property . . . . 
. . . [I]f there is no substitute or alternative remedy provided, abrogation 
of the remedy or cause of action may be justified only if there is a clear 
social or economic evil to be eliminated and the elimination of an existing 
legal remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the 
objective. 
Berry, 111 P.2d at 680 (citations omitted). 
Section 63-30-34 clearly does not satisfy the requirements of article I, section 11. 
The statute does not provide an injured person such as McCorvey an effective and 
reasonable alternative remedy. Clearly, a statute that limits recovery to just six percent 
of a person's actual out-of-pocket losses does not provide a remedy "substantially equal 
in value" to what was lost. 
Moreover, abrogation of the remedy is not justified by the need to eliminate a clear 
social or economic evil. In fact, the Condemarin majority found the asserted justifica-
tions advanced for the statutory cap "extraordinarily weak." See id- at 369 (per 
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Zimmerman, J.). See also id. at 363-64 (Durham, J.) & 373-74 (Stewart, J.). Even if 
there were a clear evil to be eliminated, the elimination of full recovery for the most 
seriously injured victims of governmental negligence is an arbitrary and unreasonable 
means for achieving the objective. It imposes the full burden of protecting the public 
treasury on Ha minuscule and vulnerable group" of badly injured persons, id. at 355 (per 
Durham, J.) (quoting Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665, 691-92 (Cal. 
1985) (Bird, C.J., dissenting), appeal dismissed. 474 U.S. 892 (1985)), a group 
"generally isolated in society . . . and rarely . . . able to rally the political process to [its] 
aid," Berry, 111 P.2d at 676. Consequently, the statutory cap violates article I, section 
11. 
Finally, the statutory cap violates the constitutional right to a jury trial in civil 
cases, guaranteed by article I, section 10 of the Utah Constitution. The determination of 
damages is part of the "substance of the common law right of trial by jury." Colgrove 
v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973). Where, as here, the amount of damages found by 
the jury far exceeds the statutory cap, the statute impermissibly infringes on the right to 
jury trial by diminishing the role of the jury in determining damages.41 
4 1
 Justice Durham was the only member of the Court to consider the effect of the 
statutory cap on the constitutional right to a jury trial in Condemarin. Although she concluded 
that she "would not hold that any limitation in actions against the government was per se invalid 
because of the infringement of the right to jury trial," she had little trouble concluding the "the 
absurdly low amount contained in the recovery limits statutes infringes egregiously on that 
right," especially where, as here, the limitation "is on its face unlikely to cover even the medical 
expenses or the plaintiff and where the state has not justified such an arbitrary limitation. 775 
P.2d at 366. 
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The application of the statutory cap is particularly unfair under the facts of this 
case. UDOT's policy was to protect members of the public driving through a highway 
construction project. To accomplish this policy, both the contract and UDOT Regulations 
required the contractor to furnish a traffic control plan that complied with the MUTCD, 
and to maintain liability insurance so that injured travelers could be fully compensated. 
Yet despite a clearly articulated policy to protect the public, UDOT deprived McCorvey 
of this protection. UDOT took it upon itself to submit a totally inadequate traffic control 
plan; whereas, had UDOT honored the contract and required the contractor to perform 
its duties as written, McCorvey would have been fully protected. Likewise, while 
LeGrand Johnson had adequate insurance to pay the full amount of the verdict, UDOT 
took that insurance coverage from Daniel McCorvey by its decision to take responsibility 
for the accident. McCorvey, therefore, was deprived of an effective remedy because of 
UDOT's unnecessary meddling.42 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should deny UDOT's cross-appeal and affirm the jury verdict in all 
particulars. With respect to McCorvey's appeal, this Court should declare the statutory 
cap imposed by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34 unconstitutional, reverse the trial court's 
decision reducing the jury verdict from $1,517,800 to $250,000, set aside the Judgment 
42This case also illustrates the potential for abuse of this recovery limits statute. As 
shown above, UDOT tried to accept full responsibility for the accident at trial. To the extent 
UDOT was successful in shifting liability from LeGrand Johnson, who could pay, to the state, 
which could assert the cap as a defense, UDOT was able to reduce not only McCorvey's 
recovery but also the amount that LeGrand Johnson was required to indemnify the State. When, 
as here, the cap is used as a shield to protect a private party (LeGrand Johnson) - not the public 
treasury -- the rationale for the cap does not apply, and neither should the statute. 
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entered by the trial court with respect to UDOT and remand this matter to the district 
court with instructions to enter judgment against UDOT in accordance with the jury's 
Special Verdict. Daniel McCorvey would also ask this Court for such other and further 
relief as to the Court seems just and equitable, including taxation of costs as provided by 
law. 
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